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THE CHICAGO "IDEA" AND IDEALISM

EVERY fundamentally new attempt at reconstruction in science involves, to some extent at least, a new terminology. The old words of a language may still be employed, but they are made to carry new meanings, and it is the task of the attentive reader to keep from slipping back into the old meanings when he would understand the new message. This commonplace reflection is suggested by the present status of the pragmatistic controversy. Professor Dewey has repeatedly complained that his critics have failed to understand him because they have interpreted what he says as if he were employing old words in their old meanings. The complaint is amply justified, and, of course, this misunderstanding is a bar to any true appreciation of his instrumental logic. There is no word which is apt to give more trouble to Professor Dewey's readers than the word "idea." The fault is not Professor Dewey's, for he has taken great pains to make clear just what he means by the term. But what he means is so different from what is ordinarily meant that it is no wonder that his critics have failed to remain true to his definition when they try to appraise the value of his statements about ideas. For instance, when one finds this challenge thrown down by Professor Dewey: "Do ideas present themselves except in situations which are doubtful and inquired into?"[1] one is apt to take up the gauntlet with confident heart, for does not every one know that ideas do present themselves constantly in situations which are untroubled by any doubt? But the cautious reader knows that the gauntlet has a string attached to it and may not be lightly taken up.

In this paper I shall try to state as best I may the new meaning of idea in Professor Dewey's writings, and then ask some questions which this new meaning suggests. But before doing this, let us take a brief survey of the current meanings of the term. The word idea has at least two quite different types of meaning in common use. These two meanings can be traced back in English to Locke and Hume. They may be called the inclusive and the exclusive significations of the word. Locke used the word of everything of

[1] This JOURNAL, Vol. V., p. 378.

which we are conscious when we think; Hume used it in antithesis to "impression." And since their days, not to go farther back, both these usages have been classic. Of course, the particular nuance which the term has in either sense is determined by the views which are held in regard to the genesis and the function or reference of ideas; and these views are various. For instance, Lotze, like Locke, set over against the world of ideas, used inclusively, a world of reality outside of ideas, which ideas are to deal with as well as they can: Professor Dewey has shown with masterly skill how Sisyphean is the task which is set for ideas in this scheme of things. The idealist, also using idea in the inclusive sense, denies that there is any reality that is not idea; he has, therefore, no need to make ideas adjust themselves to a reality which is not ideal: the only adjustment necessary is among the ideas themselves. Hume, taking the term in an exclusive sense, finds, however, no work cut out for ideas in the fact that they are not exhaustive of reality. They carry no reference to the other class of realities. All they have to do is to be more or less lively, and the laws of association manage this business for them. The psychologist of the present day is apt to use the word in the exclusive sense fixed by Hume, but, following the hint given by Hume himself, although not developed by him, the psychologist regards ideas as those elements in experience that are due to central stimulations of the cortex, as opposed to sensations which are due to peripheral stimulations. The "plain man" uses the term in a manner similar to that adopted by the psychologist, although, of course, he has very vague notions of the basis of the distinction between idea and sensation. I think that it can properly be said that the psychological employment of the term is merely a refined and critical adaptation of the vulgar use. Now, when ideas are used in this way in antithesis to sensation, it may be recognized that they not only are occurrences accounted for by their connection with brain-processes, but also are in some way the vehicles of knowledge. They have not only a structure and a genesis, but also a function and a value determined by the success with which they perform their function. This function is knowing. The examination of this function and of the value of ideas in this functional process is generally turned over by the psychologist to the epistemologist. If the latter takes up the problem on its own account and ignores the psychological problems of structure and genesis, we have then two abstract sciences standing side by side, much to the scandal of pragmatists and humanists. The division of labor is regarded as an ultimate and hopeless scission of the material taken in hand. The living unity of experience is dissected into dead members, and where is the Isis to gather up the scattered anatomy

of experience, and where is the Ezekiel to prophesy upon the dead bones that they may live? There is no goddess in Egypt and no prophet in Israel in these days.

But we have the pragmatist who can see to it that the default of supernatural beings shall not be fatal to natural human knowing. He employs an ounce of prevention where they would have resorted to tons and tons of miraculous cure. He would have no division of labor between psychology and epistemology, for, of course, division of labor is division of what you labor on, and this is to be avoided at all hazards. One unspecialized type of laborer is to be employed on the work, and this secures unity of finished product. Assembling is an impossibility in manufacture; hence do nothing that will make it necessary. The logician can do all the work and keep the parts together from start to finish.

This, of course, necessitates a new terminology in the factory. The real trouble with the antiquated method is found in the kind of distinction that is made between "ideas, meanings, thoughts, ways of conceiving, comprehending, interpreting facts," "suggestions, guesses, theories, estimates," etc., on the one hand, and "facts," "objects," "data," and what not, on the other. These are not forever fixed in their eternal state; else they have done with things below. They are simply instrumental distinctions, functional variants, and are just what at any time you take them to be. Of course, even thus, you can not get rid of the distinctions, and so can not get rid of division of labor; but you have a different kind of division of labor. The division here falls upon the material which the logician studies, not upon the students of the material. As this material is living reflective experience, it can temporarily endure all sorts of tensions and distractions, taking these up and working them over till it effects a reorganization. Indeed, without this tension and distraction, there would be no thinking life. But the student of this life must not divide what in life is connected even in its division. So that, while in this new way of ideas "datum and ideatum are divisions of labor, cooperative instrumentalities, for economical dealing with the problem of the maintenance of the integrity of experience," the logician must recognize that either "is a sheer abstraction from the standpoint either of the organized experience left behind, or of the reorganized experience which is the end—the objective."[2] "Thus the distinction between subjectivity and

[2] "Studies in Logical Theory," p. 52. The second quotation is taken out of its narrower context, where the subject of the sentence is a particular datum, namely, "Mere change of apparent position of sun, which is absolutely unquestioned as datum." But the larger context, I think, justifies the use to which I have put this clause.

objectivity is not one between meaning as such and datum as such. It is a specification that emerges, correspondently, in *both* datum and ideatum, as affairs of the direction of logical movement. That which is left behind in the evolution of accepted meaning is characterized as real, but only in a psychical sense; that which is moved toward is regarded as real in an objective, cosmic sense."[3] The psychic, the ideal, on the one hand, the cosmic, the objective, on the other, are thus nothing but shifting values in the ever growing unity of experience. Just what shift is made is determined by the problem and its solution in any definite concrete situation. When an intellectual problem is taken up in experience, there is always something that for the time being is accepted as fact—this is the datum; there is something else which is suggested as somehow appertaining to this fact—this is idea. The idea may be subsequently rejected in the outcome of thought's travail—it is then definitively for this occasion characterized as merely psychic. On the contrary, the suggestion may be accepted; it then merges with the datum, after the latter has been correspondingly changed to receive the suggested content, and it ceases to be an idea for the occasion and becomes objective cosmic fact.

Not only is this shifting according to the concrete emergencies and the concrete achievements of the logical process a fate which befalls ideas and data, it likewise draws into its kaleidoscopic field even the terms sensation and image. "One of the aims of the 'Studies in Logical Theory' was to show . . . that . . . such distinctions as sensation, image, etc., mark instruments and crises in the development of controlled judgment, *i. e.*, of inferential conclusions."[4] Whether any experience is to be considered sensational is not determined then by resort to psychophysical investigation—except, perhaps, where the problem is psychophysical and not logical?—but by consideration of the harmonious outcome of the previously disturbed situation. We are not told whether sensation is synonymous with accepted fact, but we are at any rate warned not to consider it "in terms of the psychology which obtained in the *critic's* mind."[5]

Now these are perfectly clear distinctions, and although I may not have done justice to the clean-cut thought in which this view is worked out, still I hope that I have blocked the distinctions out sufficiently for recognition by their author and by others. But what follows? I think that we must agree that one thing follows; namely, the necessity of giving just the kind of answer that Pro-

[3] *Op. cit.*, pp. 53–54.
[4] This JOURNAL, Vol. V., p. 376.
[5] *Ibid.*, p. 377.

fessor Dewey gives to the five sets of questions which he asks on page 378 of the current volume of this JOURNAL. According to this new definition of ideas and of facts, ideas do *not* present themselves except in situations which are doubtful and inquired into. They do *not* exist side by side with the facts to which they refer *when* these facts are themselves known. They do *not* exist except when judgment is in suspense. They are *nothing but* the suggestions, conjectures, hypotheses, theories, tentatively entertained during a suspended conclusion, and so forth and so forth. *These answers are determined by the definitions already given of fact and idea,* and no examination of actual thinking experience is necessary for making the appropriate reply. All one has to do is to examine the definitions of the terms used, just as in Euclidean geometry all that one has to do in determining whether parallel lines meet is to consult the definition of parallel lines. The scheme is beautifully simple, and if you adhere to it, you get rid of some very disagreeable questions which force themselves on you if you refuse to adopt it. But if the questions referred to are asked with a view to determining whether the new way of ideas comports with facts, then we have a different matter on our hands. Into this question I can not go at present.

However, there are some questions which force themselves on me when I try to accept the new scheme on which the definitions rest. Is not the scheme a thoroughgoing idealism, and a subjective idealism at that? But to guard against misunderstanding in putting the question, let me hasten to say at once that I do not conceive the point of view underlying these definitions to be idealistic, if the connotation of "idealistic" is adapted to that of "idea" in the scheme. The "Studies in Logical Theory" admits the existence of facts as well as of ideas, each defined in a special way. Professor Dewey, therefore, has a perfect right to repel the suggestion that his scheme is idealistic, if idealism is defined according to "idea" in that scheme. We all remember how mildly indignant Bishop Berkeley used to get when the suggestion arose that his way of ideas did away with matter. He easily showed that it did no such thing. Did not the whole choir of heaven and furniture of earth find its place in his idealism, and what is meant by matter anyway but just such things as make heaven vocal and earth comfortable? But I believe that it is fairly settled these days, if it were ever doubted, that the fact that Berkeley's views admitted these material things did not make his doctrine non-idealistic. There is a *current* definition of idealism according to which we gauge systems as idealistic or not. Is Professor Dewey's system idealistic *according to this definition?* Idealism seems to be generally applied to any theory which regards all

reality as embraced within experiences or within Experience. It is the view that recognizes no residual reality uncatalogued after the inventory of all experience is taken. The thinker called idealistic may not even use the term experience; but we can see from his writings whether, if he had used that term as it is now generally used, he would have been willing to say with Mr. Bradley: "I am driven to the conclusion that for me experience is the same as reality. The fact that falls elsewhere seems, in my mind, to be a mere word and a failure, or else an attempt at self-contradiction. It is a vicious abstraction whose existence is meaningless nonsense, and is therefore not possible."[6] If any thinker endorses these words, he is an idealist. Now when any of Professor Dewey's critics calls him idealistic, the critic uses the term in this current sense. When Professor Dewey repudiates the epithet, does he use the term in another sense? If so, are they not both right, each in his own way? Professor Dewey hardly refutes the claim of his opponent by failing to meet the claim on its own grounds. A clear unambiguous answer from Professor Dewey to the question whether he is an idealist in the current sense of idealism as defined above would, I am sure, make his view much more intelligible. Most of his readers have found him idealistic, only to be told that they are miserably mistaken. This has left them miserably nonplussed. If Professor Dewey thinks that it is too much of an accommodation to the weakness of his readers to answer the above question, he can at least tell us what *he* means by idealism, when he denies that he is an idealist. And if in the definition he employs the term idea, he can tell us whether that term is to be taken in the sense of the "Studies in Logical Theory."[7]

But, of course, when experience is used in the definition of idealism, we have another difficulty. What is meant by experience? The ordinary man in his ordinariness uses this term as in the first instance not inclusive of all reality. For he seems to find experience a very shifting thing. What is part of experience at one time is not part of it at another. Even if experience be used in the most inclusive sense as embracing ideas, guesses, hypotheses, theories, as well as facts, still these, of course, are in constant flux, as

[6] "Appearance and Reality," 2d edition, p. 145.

[7] While I am asking questions, I should like to put another: What does Professor Dewey mean by "rationalism" and "rationalistic"? The rationalism of the *Aufklärung* we think we know, and we know that we are not rationalists of that sort; but we do not know whether we are rationalists in this seemingly new and derogatory sense in which the term is frequently used in his recent writings. It is natural that we do not like to be charged with being rationalists without being allowed to plead guilty or not guilty with the law of the term before us.

pragmatism tells us. Not only do these unstable beings chassé backwards and forwards in the figures they describe, but they often chassé incontinently out of these figures altogether. When this evanishment occurs, the ordinary man is apt to say that the wayward beings are no longer parts of the experience. Experience goes along without them. Yesterday I saw a certain stone by a brookside. To-day I remember that I saw it. In the interval I neither saw it nor remembered seeing it, nor had the least inkling of its presence. *Abiit, excessit, evasit, erupit.* Its eruption was clean out of experience. Experience, thus used, is a most labile thing; but this very slipperiness and instability is a part of its essence in ordinary thought. But there is another meaning of the term, an extraordinary meaning, but nevertheless prevalent in philosophical writings. Out of this Experience there is no exit, not even by way of fire-escape. It does even more for what we in our finitude and mutability lose from time to time than what the Grecian Urn does for the lover and his lady. The urn stereotypes just one moment of their lives. "Forever wilt thou love and she be fair." But Experience stereotypes all the moments of all lives, everything that was or is or ever shall be, upon the bosom of a flowing river, where it is both fixed and fluid. Either kind of experience has its difficulties for experience, although we are told that neither kind has any for Experience. But either kind is just what it is, not what it is not; it contains just what it contains, not what it does not. Professor Dewey will have none of the capitalized sort, yet he will have nothing that is not experience. But as we have seen, lower-case experience has no room for vanished stones, except as memories which themselves vanish most of the time; and this seems to be the reason why the humanistic pragmatist turns stones into self-supporting experiences. In this Professor Dewey disdains to follow the humanist. Now, the question is whether Professor Dewey uses experience in some other sense than one of those above mentioned. If he does not, is he not a subjective idealist? He is full of admiration for the "miracle" which the epistemologist works in getting his ideas united with fact; the epistemologist would feel justified in retorting the admiration if the pragmatist should attempt to make fragmentary and elusive experience, without a purchase in something more permanent, bring out of non-existence just what it always needs for the solution of its logical puzzles. But if what has disappeared from experience still lives on in spite of its disappearance, and yet does so in no eternal Experience, then how does this way of taking experience and its needed complement differ from strictly objectivistic realism? But how, according to the "Studies," can what vanishes from experience continue to exist except as a sheer (unwar-

ranted?) abstraction from the standpoint of organized or reorganized experience?

There is one further difficulty that I wish to lay before Professor Dewey in connection with his new distinction between fact and idea. I suppose that most of us accept the other side of the moon as a fact, on a par *as fact* with this side of it. If we do not accept it, there seems to be considerable disturbance in experience, which, I believe, will continue in most of us till the other side gets accepted. Then it becomes "fact." This fact, while as accepted fact it is on a parity with this side of the moon, yet as experienced fact seems to differ considerably from it. I can see the one; I can not see the other. Grant that the term sensation should lose its ordinary acceptation and become merely a term to mark an instrument or crisis in the development of inferential conclusions. Still there is, after the conclusion is reached that the moon has two hemispheres, a considerable difference in our experience between the two hemispheres, and this difference does not seem to budge however we may pry upon it with changed meanings of terms. The realist, following the ordinary usage, says that while there are two lunar hemispheres, only one can be immediately experienced, and the other is accessible to us only by means of idea. If he is forced to accept the Chicago lexicography he finds himself at a loss to express himself on this point, but unfortunately he does not find any loss of the fact to be expressed. What is pragmatism going to do with this difference? If it ignores it, can it keep peace with science—a peace it is proud of proclaiming as one of its achievements? Science makes a thoroughgoing distinction between observation and inference, between empirical facts and scientific constructions upon the basis of facts. Now it is one of the great merits of the "Studies" that it has pointed out the ambiguous nature of much of what is taken by science to be fact and what is taken to be theory. But may not the ambiguity be pressed just a little too far? What we take to be a satellite, 240,000 miles distant from the planetary earth, may after all not prove to be what we think it is. But suppose that such a change in scientific construction should ever take place? All is not lost from present scientific fact; there remains the fact that there is a bright something occasionally in experience, growing from slender crescent to full orb. This fact antedated Ptolemy and has long survived Copernicus, and will, I think, survive Copernicanism if the latter, having had its day, should ever cease to be. This fact may come to be interpreted as anything you please, and get accepted as that thing; but it will be there to be accepted somehow whenever any one constituted like us opens his eyes and turns them in the right direction at an opportune time. This kind of fact, and there

are many of them, forms the inexpugnable datum of thought. It is the givenest of givens, *datissimum datorum*. Thought does not seem to have anything to do with the making of it—although the idealist has another account of the matter. Nor can thought do much[8] in the way of changing these *datissima*. Not only do they constitute the prime starting-point of all scientific problems, but they retain their pristine character throughout the thought process and after thought has done its perfect work. While ideas and data of a secondary order play their game of hide-and-seek with each other, these data of the first order are in the game, but not of it. They give to one lunar hemisphere a primacy which no terrestrial thought-reorganization can give to the other. Now a philosophy which keeps close to experience can not well ignore this distinction between the two kinds of data. Bow the difference out of the front door by refusing to recognize it under its old style of difference between sensation and idea, and it will come in at the back door unnamed, but no less obtrusive. Can logic afford to ignore it? If it does not ignore it, can pragmatic logic fix it somewhere, mid this dance of plastic circumstance which it portrays so well, but which the old logic would fain arrest; can it fix it there without giving up the thorough plasticity of circumstance?

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CRITICAL REALISM AND THE TIME PROBLEM. II.

IN a previous article I sought to show that real time is identical with change in a self-conserving process; that the puzzle of permanence or identity and change no longer balks advance when "process" is made the prime category; that a complete reversal of outlook in modern times makes the adoption of a "process view" imperative and forces us to discard an identity based on static permanence and to substitute, in its stead, organization—organization which is maintained immanently and which is neither changeless nor an entity; also that change is greater the more intricate, differentiated, and complex the organization.

I wish now to indicate how such a position can be used to explain the individual's time-experience and time-construction. Before I attempt the explanation of this extremely difficult problem, however, I would like to make as clear as possible the theory of knowledge bound up with, and supporting, critical realism. The

[8] How much thought can do in this matter is an interesting question which we can not enter into here.

connection of the individual with the larger process of which he is a freely-moving part must be realized before the conclusions of the first article can be seen to have definite bearings. Since, then, comprehension of the ensuing discussion of time will depend in large measure upon a grasp of the main principles of critical realism, I state these principles, and as concisely as is compatible with clearness.

First, the individual's experience is a changing "microcosm"; and logic is concerned with the study of processes within this "microcosm," especially with the inferential relations among thing-experiences and with the development and significance of meanings and distinctions, such as, physical and psychical, matter and consciousness, etc. In short, logic is not metaphysics, but clears the way for metaphysics, and is not directly interested in solipsism or pluralism. Logic "might well be written from the standpoint of solipsism." Elsewhere I have protested that a large share of the new realism is a logical realism which has at last overcome the confusions due to the special view-point of psychology.

Second, the protest of Professors Taylor, Dewey, Bawden, and others, that the mind-body relation is a methodological problem, more or less an artifact, holds against the reification of such contrast-categories as the physical and the psychical, matter or energy, and mind. These dualisms are developed in the impersonal logic of psychology and physics and have a methodological, not an ontological, import. On the other hand, the relation of the individual's experiencing to the rest of him which we call his body, as a part of reality, is *the vital metaphysical problem and the key to critical realism.*[1]

Third, in order to understand critical realism, the individual's experience must be viewed as incarnated in his body looked upon as an existence functioning in relation to other existences. I have designated this view a *functional identity* or *variancy* view; and, by showing that experience is not a "stuff"—since it is not con-

[1] Since my solution of the mind-body problem emphasizes the reactive unity of the whole individual, just as Professor Dewey's does, a statement of the main difference may be worth while. This can best be brought out in connection with the note (p. 65) in his essay in the James "Festschrift." "It is interesting to note how the metaphysical puzzles regarding 'parallelism,' 'interaction,' 'automatism,' evaporate when one ceases isolating the brain into a peculiar physical substrate of mind at large and treats it simply as one portion of the body, as the instrumentality of adaptive behavior." This is distinctly the objective, biological, outlook, and might well have been written, say, by Jennings. Instead of passing through and beyond subjectivism to an adequate conception of the individual, Professor Dewey has taken refuge in the impersonal objectivism of science.

served—I have tried to prove that this position does not conflict with the conservation of the capacity for activity on the part of reality (conservation of energy).[2]

Fourth, the condemnation of experience-in-general and the assertion that experience is always an individual's experience and connected with a body, lead to a frank pluralism in regard to experiencing. Individuals have distinct experiences, just as they have different bodies. Their bodies are, however, in dynamic continuity with each other and with other existences.

Fifth, the terror of solipsism is absolutely uncalled for and results from idealism reenforced by the "states of consciousness" fallacy and by a false conception of knowledge. Let us frankly recognize, as *e. g.*, Cornelius does and as James used to do, that we can not have another's experience actually, any more than we can *be* a stone or a tree. I am afraid that philosophy has often lacked the courage to face squarely up to facts and has, thereby, missed the chance of solving her problems. A genetic study of how our knowledge of others is obtained—showing how it depends on the interpretation by each of the ways of acting of the bodies of other people, including here the vocal organs—would have led to a correct idea of what knowledge means in this case, and would have prevented the puzzledom called transcendence of experience, which critical realism is supposed to require. The discussion of ejects would take on a healthier tone if the genetic attitude were adopted. I sought to do this some time ago and arrived at an interesting result; viz., that another's body becomes an eject, just as his experience does, and that the two always go hand in hand.

Sixth, the transcendence of an individual's experience—obviously I will have nothing to do with such a phrase as transsubjective reference—which has perplexed so many, is a pseudo-problem. In the first place, experience is looked upon semi-spatially when transcendence is talked about. This is the curse of a still-lingering "states of consciousness" outlook. One is supposed—in a dim, groping way—to perform a magic act; a jumping out of one's spiritual skin is hesitatingly invoked. In the second place, *knowing* an existence is regarded as a sort of *being* that existence, or, at least, a mental hand is conjectured to touch the existence with a ghostly, yet reassuring, caress. A study of *experiencing* as incarnated in the body, as an expression of the body in its dynamic relations with other existences, would have led to an apprehension of the unreality of the problem. The correct and illuminating questions are: What is the function of experience? What can it be expected to tell us of the existences around the body? I recognize how important this

[2] Cf. *Psychological Review*, July, 1908.

problem is, if critical realism is ever to shake itself loose from the worrying attacks of idealism and to become more than a bewildered protest. I believe that experience tells us the function, structure, and relations of existences, and that, in doing this, it is not compelled to transcend itself. My present purpose forbids me to enter further into this field at this time.

This is my *credo*. I hope it may give the setting of the individual, which is needed.

When this view of the individual as a highly organized process in dynamic continuity with other processes in various grades, and kinds, of organization is once grasped, the time problem speedily takes on a new light. Change is characteristic of the individual, but so is organization and the conservation of past activities which it implies. Now, if change appears in experience as time-perception, may not time-construction represent the side of conservation and organization? Though consciousness can not abolish change—for that, as Hobbes saw, would be suicidal—its survey becomes more and more comprehensive. Experiencing, incarnated in the individual, reflects this organization in systems of meaning, values, and time and space constructs. This inevitable parallelism can not be understood if the alienness of consciousness to the body is held. It is in this sense alone that Bosanquet is right when he says, "the consciousness for which there is time has begun a process which tends to abolish time."[3] Experience, like reality, has, as we would expect from our position, the two aspects of change and relative persistence, but in neither case does this fact imply permanent entities, whether "bits" of consciousness or "bits" of matter.

The psychology of the movement from perceptual to conceptual time, I shall, in large measure, take for granted. We construct nature in time after the same fashion that we construct it in space. Since man has the power of initiative, *i. e.*, is free moving, he is able to bring himself into relation with various parts of reality and is thus empowered—given his reasoning and constructive or organizing faculty—to establish controls to aid him in a larger and more perfect activity. I refer to maps and knowledge of topography as well as to inventions, such as motors, railroads, etc., which consist in the use of the functions of existences in a directed way. In like manner, there is every practical reason for him to throw his experiences into the order in which they occurred and thus to erect an objective (logically objective) system which seeks to correspond to the course of the reality-process itself. The need of bringing his past experience to bear upon present problems puts a premium upon this endeavor. Recent discussions of causation have emphasized

[3] "Logic," p. 267.

this practical motive almost *ad nauseam.* When the conceptual world of succession outreaches his own memory, the persistence of "form" in reality is fruitfully employed by inference; fossils, strata, historical documents tell their tale to the individual's inquiring mind. Communication with others, the reading of books, the whole social tradition, thus achieved, give aid.

There can be little dispute about the above sketch of our space and time construction. The disagreement will most likely arise in regard to its metaphysical interpretation.

Memory, as Hering has well shown, must have its basis in the nature of reality (he as a scientist speaks of matter). But memory in reality, as we saw in the first article, is identical with persisting organization; and man's memory is not a resurrection of a dead past, but a *function of actual organization as conserving past functioning.* This view is made evident by the fact that disorganization or dissociation involves loss of memory. I shall presume that every one to-day admits that memory is not a resurrection of a past experience as such. Here, as elsewhere, it is seen that stereometical organization dominates over any linear idea of time in reality.

It were well, at this point, to notice that the "present" has two meanings in experience, which are constantly confused. As the "specious present," it represents the grip of attention, the relative persistence of functioning. Within this specious present—which, by the way, requires no synthetic ego for its explanation—differences exist which become clearer upon analysis and may then be designated "contrast-meanings" of succession. These are the "now," "no longer," and "not yet" of current psychology. Any sharp distinction between perception and conception tends to produce an unreal problem here; for, just as our ordinary perceptual space is now tinged with the more conceptual space of science, so perceptual time seldom has its naïveté. Immediate experience must be our refuge. As we grow older, whether as a race or as individuals, we live in a larger world, spatially and temporally. This means that in our reflective consciousness an objective time-order has arisen, freed so far as possible from distorting perspective, and that, within this time-construction, the present, not as an undissectable moment, but as a chosen series of events, has contrast-relations with a past and a future. Such a past or a future is as real as the present contrasted with it, so far as presence within my experience is concerned. Yet all the while these times are objects of thought within a continuously changing "specious present." Since, in ideational thought, our interest is not directed towards the transitions of our experience as such, but towards the ideas, and since these ideas are of wide scope and fairly stable import, the awareness of change is

not prominent as it is in more distinctly perceptual experiences, as, *e. g.*, in rhythms. "Every experience thus holds in suspense within itself knowledge with its entire object-world, however big or little."[4]

This tremendous complexity of immediate experience has often led idealists astray. Bosanquet and Taylor furnish good illustrations of this error. Their discussion of causation, in which they seek to identify cause with complete ground, and thus exclude temporal relationship between the cause and effect, is shot through with this misapprehension; as is likewise all reification of logical validity. Idealism can not escape the flow of immediate experience itself; change, transition, variancy must be acknowledged. Because certain aspects of time on the ideational level can best be studied in connection with causation, and because, moreover, they do not affect our main conclusions, I shall postpone their treatment until I take up critical realism in its relation to causation.

Certain philosophers have maintained that the future is in some sense real.[5] This position may depend on a confusion between the present as the specious present and the present as a contrast-meaning in a time-construction; but it usually arises from an interest in an absolute for whom time, as we experience it, is appearance. Now critical realism has no absolute experiencer, and so this problem does not arise for it. Critical realism also escapes the puzzles of a world teleology, which theology always tangles herself in. To say that the future exists *now*, would be a contradiction for which there is no motive in naturalism. Much more effectively than pragmatism, because squarely and candidly, does a plastic naturalism meet pseudo-problems. No support can be obtained for the future in the reality-process which includes the individual; for, in this realm, time is identifiable with change, and even the word "present" is metaphorical and signifies the organization existing during a given rhythmical movement. Space and movements in space dominate the formation of objective or common time.

Is time, then, mere appearance? Certainly not; this term has no metaphysical, but only a logical, significance for critical realism. The vital distinction for this latter is the experience of the individual in contrast to reality as a larger process which includes this individual. No note of depreciation enters into this contrast, such as enters into that of appearance and reality, so popular with absolute idealism. The individual must be and remain the point of departure for critical realism, but an individual whose tremendous complexity and scope are no longer forgotten.

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[4] Dewey, "Reality as Experience," this JOURNAL, Vol. III., p. 253.
[5] V. Taylor and Royce.

REVIEWS AND ABSTRACTS OF LITERATURE

L'évolution créatrice. HENRI BERGSON. Paris: Felix Alcan. 1908. Pp. 399.

This book is the third of M. Bergson's important philosophical works. The first, the "Essai sur les données immédiates de la conscience," is an arraignment of determinism, and of philosophical intellectualism generally, by way of a critique of physical science, or knowledge of the immediate data of consciousness. In this earliest work, the theory of real duration, the foundation of the Bergsonian philosophy, is enunciated, and in the light of it intellect is shown to falsify the nature of consciousness in applying to conscious states such categories as intensity, multiplicity, organization. Each of these categories, in its traditional application, is a quantifying and a spatializing of consciousness. The intensity of a state is nothing but the state itself; the state is pure quality or heterogeneity, incapable of measure and degree. The multiplicity of conscious states has no analogy with plurality. Plurality is simultaneity and juxtaposition; but conscious states prolong each other in an interpenetrating flow. Finally, the organization of conscious states is nothing like the traditional systematic "coordination" of associationistic psychology. It does not lend itself to laws and principles. It can not be adequately expressed by words, nor artificially reconstructed by a juxtaposition of simple states, for it is always an absolutely new and original phase of our duration, and is itself a simple thing.

The "Essai" thus charges intellect with failure to know the sample of reality that we have in our own existence. The world of the intellectual categories, the physical world of quantity and space, is another sphere of existence than the world of consciousness and life; its ways are not the ways of life and motion. What physics calls motion is nothing but a relation of points; its study is the study of immobilities.

Bergson's second philosophical work, "Matière et mémoire," finds that psychology as a natural science is as narrowly intellectualistic as physics, spatializing the duration of mental life, juxtaposing and interrelating its "states" as discrete entities, thereby falsifying its true nature. The central theme of this book is the relation of mind and body. The body is an instrument of action only, the brain an apparatus of transmission and modification of motion, converting incoming disturbances into outgoing actions. Perception is the virtual or preparatory stage of the subject's activity on things, all that might be, of action on physical environment. Environment obstructively modifies the activity of mind, and as the mind approaches the ideal limit of activity unimpeded by matter, its state is nearer and nearer the state of dreaming.

This idea of the variation of cognitive states between two limits, dreaming and action, shall serve us presently in an attempt to understand more clearly the distinction so much insisted on in all Bergson's writings, and especially in "L'évolution créatrice," between what Professor James has named knowledge-about and acquaintance-with. The latter Bergson

regards as instinctive, not thought, but lived; while knowledge-about is the merely instantaneous and external view of reality with which intelligence vainly tries, "cinematographically," to reconstruct the real flow.

"L'évolution créatrice" amplifies the main theses of the earlier works, and applies, to biology, the same criterion of reality, namely, duration, by which physics and psychology have been found unproductive of any knowledge which philosophy can recognize. A *science* of biology can only be knowledge of the inert. Its study of species, forms, or essences is devitalized by ignoring the real efficacy of time in evolution. Every evolutionary theory is and must be mechanistic or finalistic—in either case intellectualistic. Having no hold on time, it affords no acquaintance with the reality of the evolutionary movement.

Before going into the matter peculiar to this book, it will be well to attempt a summary account of that idea which is the center of Bergson's thought, his idea of real duration, with its general bearing on his metaphysics and epistemology.

Bergson regards knowledge of oneself as a privileged case of knowing; oneself, he thinks, is the sample of reality which best serves for an acquaintance with the nature of reality in general. "The existence of which we are best assured and which we best know is unquestionably the existence of ourselves, for of all other objects our notions might be regarded as external and superficial, while we perceive ourselves inwardly, deeply" (p. 1).

Our existence is a perpetual flow of transition. That we think of our states as distinct from each other is due to the fact that reflection on one's own existence is, unlike the flow of that existence itself, necessarily discontinuous. It is only now and then that motives arise which turn the attention to the self as an object, like others, for examination. The flow of change is not uniform, to be sure. It is quite imperceptible to our reflective attention most of the time, but if it ever ceased, we should at that moment cease to exist. Only the relatively sudden and interesting periods of transition get our attention. Then we see a new "state of consciousness" which we add to the others that we have mentally strung together in a temporal line. So we conceive of our history as the sum of elements as distinct as beads on a string.

Bergson makes two observations regarding this intellectual view of oneself: first, it is a false view of the nature of the sample of reality on which we must rely, ultimately, for true knowledge of reality in general; and second, so far from causing practical difficulty, this view, false though it is, is the only one which makes oneself a possible object of one's own activity, or even of logical thought. For any possible object of action or of logical thought is a spatialized object, distinct, external to other objects. It has definiteness and geometrical relatedness. It is a term, and has a name. Try to define the self, or even to name it, and you falsify its true inner nature. You really define and name only a static, spatialized symbol of it instead of itself. Yet without definition and designation it gives no hold to action or to thought.

This intellectualistic view of the self eliminates the peculiar characteristic of its reality, namely, its duration, or the flow of its change. Like a snowball, accumulating its substance as it rolls, duration goes on preserving itself in incessant change that accumulates all its past. "Time," Bergson says, "is the very stuff the psychological life is made of. There is, moreover, no stuff more resistant or more substantial" (p. 4).

Life and inertia or matter are two antagonistic principles or tendencies. Life is the positive and active principle; reality and duration are predicable only of life. Inertia is an "inversion" or "interruption" of life; its value is negative to life and to reality. "All that appears positive to the physicist and to the geometrician would become, from this point of view, interruption or inversion of true positivity, which must be defined in psychological terms" (p. 227). Matter is a diminution of reality in much the same sense as that in which the reality of the Platonic idea suffers diminution under the influence of the principle of not-being, resulting in a world of sensible experience or of appearance. Bergson points out that the real in Plato is the timeless, motionless, definite idea, and the relatively unreal is the ever-changing "infinite" or indefinable datum of experience, to which duration is essential. Bergson reverses the Platonic metaphysics: reality is the ever-changing and indefinable; rather, it is change itself ("... there are no things, there is only action. ... things and states are only our mind's views of becoming") (pp. 269, 270). The principle antagonistic to reality gives rise to the timeless, definite concept, which is a view or appearance of reality operated by intelligence in the service of action. As our practical interests break up the continuum of time into discrete states, so they break up the continuum of matter into distinct bodies. The active antagonism of time, which is pure quality or heterogeneity, and space, which is pure quantity or homogeneity, results in the world of our experience, comprising "states" of consciousness and things or objects.

But it is impossible, at least to the present reviewer, to make the existential status of matter in Bergson's philosophy otherwise than obscure. Time and space, being essentially antagonistic, must therefore *essentially* imply each other; and if so, do they not stand in the same rank as real existences? In what sense is either real and the other unreal, except by an arbitrary decree? The limits of this paper do not permit of exposition or criticism of this important point. The metaphysical obscurity has its corresponding epistemological obscurity as to the cognitive status of knowledge of matter, which is the crux of Bergson's philosophy. Let us merely note, at this point, the two premises which Bergson sets in clear light, and the conclusion which seems to follow inevitably from them: matter is without duration; duration is a name for reality; therefore matter is not real.

Instinct is suited to the knowledge of life and duration, intelligence is suited to the knowledge of inert matter only. Instinct is the knowledge which Professor James calls "acquaintance-with" as distinguished from "knowledge-about" or intelligence. Science, Bergson remarks, says many things about time, but affords no acquaintance with time itself. The

duration of the unit of time is a matter of indifference to the meaning and value of any scientific formula. For example, if this unit were made infinity, and the physical process represented by the formula were thus regarded as infinitely quick, *i. e.*, an instantaneous, timeless fact, the instantaneity of the fact would be irrelevant to any truth expressed by the formula. The only truth the formula expresses is a system of relations, which remains the same for any unit of time.

Science knows no past nor future, nothing but an incessantly renewed instantaneous present, without substance. The conclusions of science are given in the premises, mathematically; the world of science is a strict determinism. In the real world of consciousness, on the other hand,—knowledge of which can only be acquaintance with it—the future is essentially contingent and unforeseeable, for each new phase is an absolute creation, into which the whole past is incorporated without determining it.

With current French philosophy generally, Bergson's interest is largely if not chiefly the problem of freedom. This problem is a conspicuous motive in all three of his books. His proof of indeterminism rests on a critique of intellectualism; the critique of intellectualism proceeds by applying to traditional metaphysics and epistemology a criterion of reality which is the chief of this author's many claims to originality. Whether science, the product of intelligence, is physical, biological, or psychological, it is knowledge-about, and not acquaintance-with; its object is relation, and not reality; its objective is action, and not vision; its organ is intelligence, not instinct. But the object of philosophy is reality; its objective is vision; its organ instinct. The timeless, intellectual way in which science knows-about, but never knows, is not the way of true philosophy. The philosopher, to know reality, must achieve a vital, sympathetic concurrence with the flow of reality. To be known, reality must be *lived*, not thought. In this book Bergson traces the genesis of instinct and intelligence to a primitive tendency, effort or spring of life (the *élan vital*), whose path bifurcates indefinitely in the course of its evolution. These elementary tendencies, instinct and intelligence, having issued from the same primitive tendency, are both present, at least in rudiment, in all forms of life; and it is the presence, though in a suppressed state, of instinct in man that must save philosophy from the emptiness of science, and give it a hold on the living fulness of reality. Bergson disclaims the purpose of offering a theory either of knowledge or of life, in this book, but aims to suggest a method of knowing reality in spite of the limitations of intelligence.

The active principle of life Bergson describes by the phrase *tendency to create*. Its movement is a creative evolution. Life flows, or, as we have said, rolls on like a snowball, in an unceasing production of new forms, each of which retains, while it modifies and adds to, all its previous forms.

But the figure of the snowball soon fails. One of the most significant facts of the creative evolution of life is the division of its primitive path into divergent paths, to which we have just referred. The primi-

tive *élan* contains elementary virtualities of tendency which can abide together only up to a certain stage of their development. It is of the nature of a tendency to break up into divergent elementary tendencies, as a fountain-jet sprays out. As the primitive tendency develops, elements contained in it which were mutually compatible in one and the same primitive organism, being still in an undeveloped stage, become incompatible as they grow. Hence the indefinite bifurcation of the forms of life into realms, phyla, genera, species, individuals. It is a cardinal error, the author thinks, to regard vegetative, instinctive, and intellectual life, in the Aristotelian manner, as successive stages in one and the same line of development. They represent three radically different lines of evolution, not three stages along the same line.

A tendency common to all life is to store the constantly diffused solar energy in reservoirs where its equilibrium is unstable. This tendency, of alimentation, is complementary to the tendency to resolve the unstable equilibrium of potential energy by sudden, explosive release of energy in actions. As the primitive organism developed (undoubtedly an ambiguous form, partaking of the characters of both the animal and the vegetable) these two tendencies became mutually incompatible in one and the same form of life. Those forms which became vegetables owe their differentiation from ancestral forms to a preponderant leaning toward the *manufacture* of the explosive, as the animal forms owe their animality to a leaning toward the release of energy in sudden and intermittent actions.

The vegetable, drawing its nourishment, wherever it may find itself, from the ground and from the air, has no need of locomotion. The animal, dependent on the vegetable or on other animals for food, must go where it may be found. The animal must move. Now consciousness emerges *pari passu* with the ability to act, and torpor is characteristic of fixity. The humblest organism is conscious to the extent to which it can act freely.

Action may be effective either by virtue of an excellence in the use of instruments of action or by virtue of an excellence in adapting the instrument to the need. Action may thus assume either of two very different characters, the one instinctive, self-adaptive reaction, the other intelligent manufacture. The two tendencies have bifurcated within the animal realm. One path reaches its present culmination in certain hymenoptera (*e. g.*, ants, bees, wasps), the other in man.

Thus the development of instinct in man has become subordinate; human consciousness is dominated by intelligence. Hence the universality of the vice of intellectualism in philosophy. Man, because he is dominated by intelligence, supposes intelligence to be coextensive with consciousness, whereas it is only one of the elementary tendencies which consciousness comprises, and the one which is impotent to know the flow of reality. Spencer's evolutionism affords no acquaintance with the reality of life. His so-called evolution starts with the already evolved. Hence all it reaches is the made, the once-for-all, the timeless. It is

merely a biological theory, and no advance over positive science. It is not a philosophy.

Having shown the origin of intelligence in the more extensive principle of consciousness in general, and limited its sphere of operation to inert matter, the author turns to the nature of instinct. The greater part of the psychic life of living beings that are characteristically instinctive Bergson believes to be states which he describes as knowledge in which there is no representation (pp. 190, 191). Representation escapes, as it were, through the vent of action. A purely instinctive action would be indistinguishable from a mere vital process. When the chick, for example, breaks its shell, it seems merely to follow the movement that has carried it through the embryonic life. But neither instinct nor intelligence is ever pure, and we have in ourselves a vague experience of what must happen in the consciousness of an animal acting by instinct. We have this experience in phenomena of feeling, in unreflecting sympathies and antipathies. "Instinct is sympathy. If this sympathy could extend its object and also reflect upon itself, it would give us the key to vital operations. . . . Intuition, to wit, instinct, become disinterested, conscious of itself, capable of reflecting upon its object and of indefinitely enlarging it, would conduct us into the very interior of life. . . . It is true that . . . intuition . . . attains only the individual, but a research may be conceived whose orientation should be that of art, and yet whose object should be life in general" (pp. 191, 192).

It is the artist much more than the scientist that really knows nature—that knows it inwardly and truly. The superiority of his knowledge is due to a sympathetic attitude much more than to any intellectual discipline in physical and chemical laws. So the true philosopher is an artist in life. The intellectualist philosopher is a dissector of life's defunct remains. Knowledge of the inwardness and essence of life is possible only through a sympathetic attitude; it is not possible through any intellectual discipline in laws and principles.

Now Bergson's idea of the philosopher—an artist in life—is probably no one's else. He is of that opinion, decidedly; a considerable part of the book is a demonstration that actual philosophers, from Plato on, are intellectualists all, dissectors, not artists. But if Bergson's enterprise is to be a *substitute* for philosophy and appropriate its name, we who are much addicted to the old enterprise will be careful to know why it is futile and illusory.

To state the case as concisely as possible, intellectualistic philosophy is charged with attempting to *know,* with a faculty that can only *know-about,* duration, which can not be known-about, but can only be known.

In the schema of the movement of knowledge between two limits, dreaming and action, to which we have referred, the elucidation of one important point would tend to modify the opposition between acquaintance-with and knowledge-about. The point is that knowledge vanishes at each limit and there becomes purely objective existence. The two

opposed *kinds* of knowledge should rather be regarded as antipodal phases between which, as limits, knowledge varies, meanwhile always remaining knowledge. Change of its phase is no strengthening or weakening of its essence. In any phase it is itself, knowledge, and nothing else. The variation in the phase of knowledge follows a variation in the dynamic relation of the subject to the object. This relation may be expressed by the ratio of the subject's virtual activity to his real activity. At one limit this ratio is zero and at the other infinity. Suppose the subject of knowledge to be automatically active toward his object, *i. e.*, the ratio of his virtual to his real activity is zero. Knowledge has vanished; an automatically active subject of knowledge is a self-contradictory expression; he is no longer a subject of *knowledge* at all. His subjectivity, from being cognitive, has become purely active. Suppose, at the other limit, the subject of knowledge, instead of being automatically active, is absolutely inert, *i. e.*, the ratio of his virtual to his real activity is infinity. Again knowledge vanishes. An inert subject of knowledge is also a self-contradictory expression. He is now again a subject of activity, but not of knowledge. For inertia, being resistance, is again force or activity—activity of negative sign, if you like, being antipodal to the other pole of knowledge.

Two things are important for our purpose, in the above remarks on Bergson's schema. First, that in all its variations of phase knowledge is always of the same nature and constitutive elements, involving a ratio of virtual to real activity in the subject; and second, that this variation of phase does not depend on or correspond to any variation of externality or distinctness between the subject and the object. Variation between identity and distinctness is inconceivable. The two relations exclude each other absolutely. Knowledge is *essentially* polarized in subject and object. So, for that matter, is existence itself, which is activity. Action of a thing on itself is a mere cancelation of terms of opposite sign, a self-contradiction. The same of knowledge of a thing by itself. *The subject and the object, whether of action or of knowledge, are necessarily absolutely external to each other.*

Bergson is treating knowledge as if it could be more or less cognitive in nature; he is treating variations of phase as if they were augmentations or diminutions of essence; he is treating quality quantitatively. Moreover, he is treating the variations in phase of knowledge as if they were determined by variations in a certain relation that is in fact invariable. This absurdity leads him to treat the relation of identity as *antipodal* to the relation of distinctness. Now the ratio zero is antipodal to the ratio infinity, but the relation of identity is *contradictory* to the relation of distinctness. True antipodes necessarily imply each other; Bergson's antipodes necessarily exclude each other.

Only by supposing that antipodes exclude each other could a function be supposed to vary between being and not-being. As between being and not-being, of knowledge, Bergson's preference of the former is obviously just. But variation between them baffles instinct and intelligence alike.

Furthermore, if the poles of knowledge are determined by the existential relations of identity and distinctness between subject and object, the pole at which knowledge "is" should be determined by the relation of distinctness, that at which knowledge "is not" by the relation of identity.

But the truth is, when a function varies between a positive and a negative pole, neither pole is an apogee where the function is most itself. On the contrary, it disappears at each pole alike. Nor is it most itself midway between the poles, nor at any other privileged position, for it is absolutely and fully itself, and nothing else, in every phase.

If any consideration extraneous to the nature of knowledge itself were to be admitted as evidence of the validity of knowledge, it would seem as if the very characteristic which is most sedulously attributed by the instinctive to the intellectualistic philosophy should give the palm to the latter. That characteristic is utility. But, in the first place, no such extraneous consideration has anything to do with the validity of knowledge, and, in the second place, the characterization of intelligence as the servant of action does not distinguish intelligence from instinct. If intelligent action, as we are told, has an "end" in mastery over nature, is this supposed to imply that instinctive action is an end in itself? Surely both alike result in a new situation, a new arrangement of matter; and the only thing that can give true finality to the intelligent act is the affective value of the conscious state arising out of this new situation. But the same is true of the situation following on the instinctive act.

It may possibly be argued that it is only acquaintance-with objects that can have any affective value, and that the instinctive kind of knowledge is, therefore, an end in itself in a sense in which intelligence is not. For knowledge-about the object will then be supposed to have no affective value in itself, but only as it may subserve action upon the object, which action will be accompanied by acquaintance-with the object. But if knowledge-about an object subserves acquaintance-with it, the converse is no less true. If knowledge of the location and price of a tennis ball subserves my use of it and acquaintance-with it, the latter in turn subserves my knowledge-about it in an indefinite number of respects. True, acquaintance-with an object may much less obviously lead to knowledge-about it than in the case of the tennis ball, but, again, the converse is equally true; for instance, the utility of a certain mathematical equation may be quite inscrutable.

Moreover, it is simply not true that knowledge-about is without affective value. Both experience and reason pronounce the contrary. If a characteristically intellectual state of mind gives you less satisfaction, or more, than one that is characteristically intuitive, the reason in either case is quite personal and accidental. It may just as well give you more as less. Being simply knowledge in either case, it has its affective element, in *some* degree, necessarily, of whichever character it may be.

"Experience of relations," "intimate acquaintance-with" (terms),

the "thing-in-itself"—all these abstractions are commonly discussed as if they were concrete entities. The yearning for intimate acquaintance-with the thing-in-itself is a morbid yearning for self-contradiction. The more you know a thing "in itself," or the more you "internalize" yourself with it—*i. e.*, the more you identify yourself with it—the less you bear any significant relation to it, any relation, obviously, but that of identity; the less, notably, you bear the active and cognitive relations to it.

In the "Essai" it is shown how, for Paul to know Peter *in himself*, Paul must do nothing less than *become* Peter. Suppose, then, that Peter is Paul's father, and devotedly fond of Paul. In such a case, it is a vital part of Peter to be wrapped up in Paul. If Paul, therefore, vanishes when he becomes Peter, he does not become *Peter;* the most important thing about Peter is now lacking, to wit, his being wrapped up in Paul. But if Paul has not vanished in becoming Peter, obviously *Paul* has not become Peter. In short, *Paul can not become Peter, just so long as Paul knows Peter.*

The thing can neither be nor be conceived except in its relations, nor the relations without the thing. If you know the thing-in-its-relations you know the thing and you know its relations. They are not two knowledges, but one and the same, with a shifting of interest or affective value. Knowledge-about terms is nothing but acquaintance-with relations. Both expressions are abstractions, and neither defines real knowledge, but merely posits the fact of universal reality, one in one way, the other in another; one as a system of relations, the other as a homogeneous aggregate of world-stuff.

If the instinctive attitude toward reality is the artistic attitude, the intellectual might be called, for the sake of symmetry, the critical attitude. But it is the *artist* that acts and the critic that judges, which seems to imply that it is instinct rather than intelligence that is the servant of action, the contrary assumption to that which is made in this book. The fact is that neither affirmation has any valid meaning for epistemology, though in a colloquial sense the opposite of the Bergsonian postulate is obviously the truth, namely, that knowledge is characteristically intellectual not as the subject is the more active, but as he is the more passive, toward his object; and so, *mutatis mutandis,* for knowledge that is characteristically instinctive. But only in a colloquial sense, for to be passive *toward an object* is to be as much engaged in an active relationship with it as to be active toward it; the activity has merely changed sign.

But the opposition between the phases of knowledge is greatly mitigated, if not quite neutralized, once the object's relation-aspect is reinstated in its true parity with the term-aspect. A quarrel could, then, hardly be kept alive over the question of the cognitive merits of thorough acquaintance-with and thorough knowledge-about. What, after all, would the difference amount to? Helen Keller gives evidence of the richest cognitive experience, with a meager equipment for acquaintance-with her

objects. Apparently it does not matter. The completeness, satisfactoriness, and richness of knowledge have nothing to do with the bias of its phase. If the artist blunders through critical defect, even more thoroughgoing art would of itself have saved him, in spite of the critical defect. If the musty philosopher is musty for lack of tact in affairs, a truer theory of life would have corrected him. No doubt sanity is balance between the two biases. Art and criticism are equally long, and the middle course is a short-cut. As a pedagogical maxim, "Keep well within the poles of knowledge" were a wise one. The "love of *wisdom*" must, indeed, be so ruled.

But it is a bias of knowledge that is on trial, and the verdict to which we are brought is that knowledge-about is as "good" and as worthy the name "philosophy," for its cognitive validity, as acquaintance-with. Both have the same cognitive validity, which is none at all, for they are abstractions. But if you find the knowledge that is characteristically acquaintance-with to be good and that which is characteristically knowledge-about to be bad, or *vice versa*, the reason is personal and accidental in either case, and can not be proposed as a criterion of cognitive validity.

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Die Wiedergeburt der Philosophie. CARL STUMPF. Leipzig: Barth. 1908. Pp. 38.

In this address, inaugural to his present rectorate at Berlin, Professor Stumpf reinterprets the fate of constructive idealism in Germany and pronounces philosophy reborn as *Erfahrungsphilosophie*. The error of classic idealism is an error of method. The most general and highest of the sciences is still a science, and can have no disparate way to truth: it must accept the rules of evidence, the conditions of research, even the pace, of all science. Aprioristic philosophy is systematized impatience: it expresses the will to be at once at the end of labor, "to transport oneself to the position of godhead in order from this vantage to comprehend the actual as necessary, the defective as perfect." But such comprehension, as Kant still saw, is not within the scope of scientific thought; it is the prerogative of will and feeling. Aprioristic philosophy is, in truth, poetry under the guise of reason. It tends to become a sort of mixture of *Denken* and *Dichten* which we call mysticism, a hybrid which must pass, while its elements in their genuine and separate condition assert their permanence:—Schiller and Goethe have suffered no such catastrophe as has Hegel. And so the philosophy that endures is the philosophy which grows out of the other sciences, tries to keep near them, uses their methods, speaks their dialect, cares to go forward only step by step, expects only relative closure of its problems, even rejoices in the fact that finality is impossible since it insures the permanent openness of the field for scientific progress and for the infinite fore-exploring of the spirit.

It must not be supposed, however, that for Professor Stumpf "scientific knowledge" is a phrase with but a single meaning. Indeed, we are

told that one of the prime movers in leading philosophy astray has been science itself, as *Geisteswissenschaft*. These sciences of spirit have the peculiarity that they assume, and are able, to treat their objects not alone as elements having external relations, but also in some measure from within. To the idealists such *nachfühlendes Erkennen* seemed the goal of all knowledge; and it was the essence of their methodic error to assume that nature and the universe at large may be known in this same fashion. But why declare this an error? In one who accepts so fully as does Professor Stumpf the main idealist contention of the "Priorität des Geistes gegenüber der Natur," it remains an unexplained dogma that some valid systematic knowledge of the universe as a whole *from within* (which is what philosophy usually means) is impossible. Philosophy must indeed welcome all declarations of the type before us to the effect that it means to regard experience; to be scientifically responsible; to accept the cost of technical labor, even of *Kleinarbeit*, in its investigations; to acknowledge its aspect as a race problem, not finishable by any one person or generation. But these acknowledgments are only negative elements in philosophic rebirth; in themselves they furnish no solution of the problem of philosophic method. Nor will the scientific spirit have yielded its due fruit in this direction except by the conquest of the objective principles of our consciousness of values—precisely the domain which, as the field of poetry and feeling, Professor Stumpf seems ready to surrender to final contrast with the field of exact knowledge.

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Psychologie des neurastheniques. P. HARTENBERG. Paris: Alcan. 1908. Pp. 246.

This work can not be said to be a psychological treatise, nor does it deal with the subject of neurasthenia in accordance with the accepted use of the term to-day. It is rather a series of descriptions of the symptoms found in psychasthenia, although in the introduction the author makes plain his purpose to construct a psychology rather than a symptomatology, and he admits that his use of the term neurasthenia is a personal conception—a *conception chemin faisant*, as he pleases to term it.

Normally, we are told, the nervous system has a certain degree of nervous tension with oscillations. The normal nervous tension may be exceeded or diminished. The latter condition is that of neurasthenia. The condition of excessive nervous tension is also something abnormal, not now described or even named, to the description and analysis of which the author promises to devote another volume. The hypothesis or supposition, we may even say the guess, of different degrees of nervous tension is not new, and it has been used previously as a verbal explanation of many cerebral or psychical conditions. Hartenberg affirms that the nervous system has only one manner of being depressed, and this manner always shows the symptomatology of neurasthenia. This, it is

almost needless to say, is an entirely unwarranted assumption. The exaggeration of nervous tension is, the reviewer believes, the same sort of myth as the supposed exaggeration of mental activity in maniacal conditions. The maximum of efficiency is to be found only in normal, never in abnormal, conditions. There may be conditions of hyperexcitability, there may be ease of motor response, but these are rather evidences of lowered tension—if we accept the terminology and use this word—as even Hartenberg admits.

The author in his definition says that neurasthenia is not a psychosis, *i. e.*, not insanity. The neurasthenic patient according to him is not insane; he will never become demented because of his neurasthenia, nor will he become delirious, and his higher mental functions (*sic*) will always remain intact (p. 18). On the other hand, the author admits there is sometimes found "l'attenuation du sentiment du reel" (p. 109), which always indicates a greater or less loss of control of judgment, and in such patients there may be defects of memory, of imagination, of attention, etc.

It can not be said that the author has added much to our knowledge of either neurasthenia or psychasthenia, and the psychological analyses are rather affirmations of the author's opinions and beliefs. For the serious or critical student the book is not indispensable, but it gives a fair idea of some common abnormal mental states and may be recommended to the laity—medical and psychological—who have neither the inclination nor the time for larger and better works.

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JOURNALS AND NEW BOOKS

ARCHIV FÜR GESCHICHTE DER PHILOSOPHIE. April, 1908. Band 21, Heft 3. *Eduard Zeller* (pp. 289–295): L. STEIN. *Zur Vorgeschichte zweier Lockescher Begriffe. I.* (pp. 296–298): C. BAEUMKER. – The concept *tabula rasa*. *Die Staatslehre des Mariana. II.* (pp. 299–332): B. ANTONIADES. – Mariana's contention that the king rules only to serve, and that otherwise he is a tyrant, whom, under certain conditions, it is the duty of a subject to slay. His functions. *Liber secundus economicorum Aristotelis. I.* (pp. 333–351): R. BLOCH. – The doctrines of this doubtful work are rather Aristotelian than stoic. *Sopra un passo illogico della logica del Rosmini* (pp. 352–356): G. CEVOLANI. *Platons Ideenlehre* (pp. 357–371): G. FALTER. – A fiery vindication of Natorp's "Platons Ideenlehre" against Gomperz's hostile criticism. *Die Sinne und die Künste. I.* (pp. 372–396): O. HILFERDING. – Art is always dramatic, self-representative, whether the public be actually present or not. *Pascals letztes Problem. I.* (pp. 397–415): F. KUNTZE. – The problem of stating the history of the world in its simplest terms, as a movement from lowliness (Adam's fall) to greatness (Christ's dominion). *Jahresbericht über*

die vorsokratische Philosophie (pp. 419–435): O. GILBERT. – Devoted to a statement of many new and amended passages appearing in the second edition of Diel's "Fragmente der Vorsokratiker," first volume. *Die neuesten Erscheinungen. Historische Abhandlungen in den Zeitschriften. Eingegangene Bücher.*

Beard, Charles Austin. *Politics: A Lecture delivered at Columbia University* February 12, 1908. New York: The Columbia University Press. Pp. 35. 25 cents.

Burnet, John. *Early Greek Philosophy.* London: Adam and Charles Black. 1908. Pp. x + 433.

Dewey, John. *Ethics: A Lecture delivered at Columbia University* March 25, 1908. New York: The Columbia University Press. Pp. 26. 25 cents.

Gibson, W. R. Boyce. *The Problem of Logic.* With the cooperation of Augusta Klein. London: Adam and Charles Black. 1908. Pp. xii + 500.

Häberlin, P. *Herbert Spencers Grundlagen der Philosophie. Ein kritische Studie.* Leipzig: Barth. 1908. Pp. iv + 205.

March, John Lewis. *A Theory of Mind.* New York: Charles Scribner's Sons. 1908. Pp. vi + 453. $2.00 *net.*

NOTES AND NEWS

COMMENTING on the report of the Royal Commission on the care and control of the feeble-minded, *Nature* for September 17 says: "The report necessarily opens up matter of great scientific interest; but the commissioners, perhaps wisely, have contented themselves with deducing from a mass of scientific evidence only such conclusions as bear upon the practical issues under their consideration. On the momentous question of the origin of mental defect, they remark somewhat plaintively (vol. viii., p. 179), 'we found it practically impossible, and deemed it undesirable, to exclude from consideration the great mass of evidence which was tendered to us in reference to the conditions and antecedents of mental defect, especially in the very large class of cases in which the evil dated from birth or from early life.' The great majority of the witnesses who spoke specially on this question (among whom were Sir T. Clifford Allbutt, Sir E. Ray Lankester, Dr. Archdall Reid, and Dr. Bevan Lewis) regarded feeble-mindedness (where not accidental) as a germinal variation, a reversion to a more primitive type of brain, and a condition which is necessarily inherited. The trend of the evidence of these witnesses was distinctly opposed to the notion that causes such as faulty nutrition, wasting diseases, or alcoholism are of importance in the production of feeble-mindedness. Considerable evidence of a contrary kind was offered, but neither the authority of the witnesses nor the data upon which they relied was sufficient to shake what is at present the accepted teaching of

biology. As might have been expected, an attempt was made by certain witnesses to put forward the opinion that the existence of mental defect in a community might be checked either by surgical or other artificial measures, or by placing obstacles in the way of the marriage of persons ascertained to be mentally defective. The commissioners repudiate these suggestions, but they nevertheless somewhat hesitatingly come to the conclusion upon the evidence submitted (vol. viii., p. 185), '(2) that especially in view of the evidence concerning fertility, the prevention of mentally defective persons from becoming parents would tend largely to diminish the number of such persons in the population.' This is an opinion on which there is much room both for doubt and discussion. Many of the feeble-minded are the children of parents of average physical and mental health; a still larger number are children of neurotic parents, who are, however, of such mental integrity that no state would venture to prohibit their unions. The number of the feeble-minded who are descendants of obviously imbecile parents, while probably not inconsiderable, does not by any means form such a proportion of the class that the prevention of their existence would 'largely' diminish the number."

PROFESSOR LOVEJOY has sent us the following: "In his *Bibliotheca Platonica* Mr. Thomas M. Johnson, of Osceola, Missouri, is engaged in publishing selections from neo-Platonic writers, some of which have not hitherto been available in English. The last number issued (1908) contains a new rendering of the 'Demonstration of the Immortality of the Soul,' from the commentary of Hermeias on the Phædrus (first translated by Thomas Taylor in the *Classical Journal,* 1820), as well as a reprint of Taylor's 'Dissertation on the Doctrine of Ideas' (published in 1792), and a paper by Mr. Johnson on 'The Fundamental Ideas of the Human Mind.' Previous issues include versions of various fragments and shorter works of Plotinus, Porphyry, Iamblichus, Proclus, and Synesius, which are not otherwise generally accessible."

THE Syndics of the Cambridge University Press and the Council of the Cambridge Philosophical Society are arranging to publish a volume in commemoration of the centenary of the birth of Darwin and the fiftieth anniversary of the publication of "The Origin of Species." The articles will be by British and foreign contributors and will treat of Darwin and evolution, Darwin's geological work, Darwin's contributions to botany, and the influence of the conception of evolution in various departments of philosophy.

PROFESSOR HUGO MÜNSTERBERG and Professor George Santayana, of Harvard University, will lecture on esthetics at Wellesley College during the coming year.

MR. L. W. COLE, recently professor of psychology at the University of Oklahoma, has accepted a position as instructor in experimental psychology at Wellesley College.

THE Oxford University Press are publishing an Index volume to "The Sacred Books of the East."